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Abstract
This paper characterizes Pareto eﬃcient income taxes in a dynamic economy with
human capital accumulation. I extend the tools and insights developed by Mirrlees
(1971) into a dynamic framework. I follow Diamond (1998) by assuming that there
are no income eﬀects on labor supply. If the government can freely borrow and save,
I show that i) the problem of ﬁnding eﬃcient allocation can be decomposed into two
relatively simple stages and ii) if agents have access to capital market (with zero tax on
capital), the eﬃcient allocations may be in some cases implemented in a competitive
equilibrium by using history independent income taxes. I compute the sequence of
optimal income taxes that implement the optimum (to be veriﬁed) and show that they
marginal income taxes tend to decrease over time and that the gains from adjustment
of human capital are about 12 times larger than the static gains from labor supply.
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11 Introduction
In this paper I study Pareto eﬃcient allocations and optimal taxes in a dynamic economy
with permanent skill shocks and endogenous human capital which is unobservable by the
government. I provide a solution method for this class of problems and solve numerically for
the dynamics of eﬃcient allocations and optimal taxes.
Recent research on dynamic optimal taxation with private information followed in the
footsteps of Mirrlees ([14],[15],[16]). It has focused primarily on cases when the dynamics of
eﬃcient allocation is driven by the fact that private information is revealed only gradually
over time (Albanesi and Sleet [1] and Battaglini and Coate[2]) or when the driving force is
the aggregate state variable (Werning [19]) or both (Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski
[5], Kocherlakota [12]). In contrast, this paper focuses on a case when the driving force
behind the dynamics is an unobservable individual speciﬁc state variable, in this case human
capital. By assuming that private information shocks are permanent, it also diﬀers from the
previously cited literature (with the exception of Werning [19]) by focusing on taxation as
a tool of redistribution, rather than the insurance against dynamically evolving shocks. In
this sense, it is probably closer to the original Mirrleesian idea of optimal taxation.
A dynamic private information environment where the dynamics is driven by individual
state variable rather than by private information is an alternative that has not been much
studied so far. One reason is that such problems have been relatively hard to solve. In
this paper I provide a key result that makes the analysis and computation of such models
tractable. It is the Decomposition theorem of Section 3. I show that the social planner’s
problem can be conveniently separated into two subproblems: a problem of redistribution
between the agents and the problem of ﬁnding the eﬃcient labor supply and human capital
allocations. This division is interesting theoretically but also provides an algorithm how to
s o l v ef o rt h ee ﬃcient allocations numerically.
This paper is closely related to Kapicka [10] where I analyze optimal steady state alloca-
tions when human capital is unobservable, the government is restricted to use current income
taxes and agents cannot borrow or save. This paper extends these results in two ways. First,
no exogenous restrictions are imposed. Second, I now solve for the whole transitional dy-
2namics of eﬃcient allocations and not just for a steady state. These additional results come
at a cost, however. First, I assume that the government can freely borrow and save at an
exogenously given interest rate rather than assuming that the resource constraint must clear
in each period. Second, I assume that preferences take a very particular form: there are no
income eﬀects on labor supply. Such preferences were used recently by Diamond [4] to gain
insights into a static optimal taxation problem. Here I show that this speciﬁcation brings
even more beneﬁts in a dynamic setting: it simpliﬁes both the computation of eﬃcient allo-
cations and the problem of their implementation in a competitive equilibrium. In addition,
Saez [17] shows that, at least in a static setting, the optimal tax is not so diﬀerent from the
case when income eﬀects are present.
The presence of private information implies that diﬀerent agent end up with diﬀerent
marginal utilities: they are equal to the shadow price of resources only on average. I introduce
a cumulative distortion function to be a function that gives, for each agent, the average
distortion for all agents with lower skills. I show that the cumulative distortion function plays
a pivotal role in the analysis of the private information economy. The reason is provided
in the Decomposition theorem in section 3: For a given agent, all one needs to know to
solve for the whole time path of labor supply and human capital allocation is his cumulative
distortion. Moreover, the problem of ﬁnding these allocations can be conveniently written
recursively and solved for numerically. One can thus think of the social planners problem in
the following way. The social planner chooses the cumulative distortion function. The agent
then solves an individual distorted problem of ﬁnding optimal labor, schooling, and human
capital allocations for a given cumulative distortion. This decomposition is very convenient
since it is the second stage that is the most complicated to analyze. In fact, while the choice
of the cumulative distortion function captures all the redistribution aspects of the model,
the individual’s distorted problem captures all the dynamics that is present in the model.
There are many ways to implement the eﬃcient allocations in a competitive equilibrium.
I argue that one particularly appealing implementation, where agent can freely borrow and
save and the government uses income taxes that depend only on current income, may be
available. The problem with this implementation is that the agent may be able to jointly
3deviate in labor supply and human capital investment. The answer to whether this is prof-
itable or not is a quantitative one. For some speciﬁcation, this may be proﬁtable and for
some it may not. The no income eﬀect speciﬁcation of the utility plays an important role
in ruling out ”triple” deviations in savings, human capital, and labor supply simultaneously.
(to be completed): I construct a veriﬁcation procedure that checks if a particular allocation
may indeed be implementable by this simple scheme.
Interestingly, if the implementation with history independent taxes works, the pattern of
government policies is much diﬀerent than in the case when the dynamics of allocations is
driven by private information ([12], [1]). Besides using a very simple income tax function,
the government’s role is not to prevent excessive saving by imposing capital taxes. On the
contrary, unrestricted borrowing and saving is essential in that it provides the agents with
the ability to transfers resources across time.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model. Section 3 charac-
terizes the eﬃcient allocations. Section 4 analyzes how to implement the eﬃcient allocations
in a competitive equilibrium. Numerical simulations and computed optimal tax codes are
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains most of the proofs.
2T h e M o d e l
Time is discrete, t ≥ 0. There is a measure 1 of agents in the economy. Each individual is
associated with a skill level θ ∈ [0,¯ θ]=Θ.
I will assume this skill level does not change over time. This is certainly a very restrictive
condition, but is necessary to keep the model tractable. Distribution of skills is given by a
distribution F. I assume that F is twice diﬀerentiable and has density f(θ). The skills are
private information of each agent: only she knows her own ability. The skills aﬀect earnings
of the agent in a way speciﬁed below.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of time. At each period, time can be divided between
leisure, work, and time spent by human capital accumulation. Denote working time as lt
and time spent by accumulating human capital by st.1
1It is necessary to interpret time spent by accumulating human capital quite extensively. This does not
4Period utility of each person depends on consumption ct and leisure 1−lt −st. I assume
that the utility function is such that there income eﬀects on leisure are zero: an individual




tU(ct + v(1 − lt − st)) 0 < β < 1.
where U : R+ → R is period utility and v :[ 0 ,1] → R is utility from leisure. I assume
that U and v are continuously diﬀerentiable on R++ × (0,1], strictly increasing and strictly
concave.
Each individual starts with initial human capital h0. To reduce the complexity of the
model, I assume that h0 is identical for all people and is observed by the government.
Agent’s human capital at the beginning of period t + 1 is denoted ht+1.I td e p e n d so nt i m e
spent accumulating it in previous period st, previous level of human capital ht and is given
by a human capital accumulation function G : R+ × [0,1] → R+:
ht+1 = G(ht,s t)
I assume that G is continuously diﬀerentiable on R++ × (0,1], strictly increasing and
strictly concave and that lim
s→0Gs(s,h)=+ ∞ for h>0. Moreover, I assume that G(h,0) ∈
(0,h)i fh>0a n dt h a tt h e r ei s¯ h such that G(¯ h,1) · ¯ h.
Human capital aﬀects production abilities of the agent. I assume an eﬃciency unit
speciﬁcation: a person with human capital ht, skills θ and working lt hours produces yt = θhtlt
at time t ≥ 0.
I ti sa s s u m e dt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n tc a nb o r r o wo rl e n da ta ni n t e r e s tr a t e1
β −1. The gov-
ernment has to ﬁnance a sequence of expenditures and the present value of the expenditures
is E. The government is supposed to maximize expected discounted utility of an agent that
is yet to draw his ability level from the distribution F.
Id e ﬁne an allocation to be a sequence of functions σ = {ct,y t,h t+1}∞
t=0 where ct : Θ → R+
speciﬁes consumption in period t, yt : Θ → R+ speciﬁes output in period t and ht+1 : Θ →
include only time spent in schools but also other activities that increase individual’s human capital, i.e.
on-the-job training.















Since agent’s skill level is a private information, the social planner needs to elicit agent’s
type from her. At the beginning of period 0 the agent is asked to report his type to the
social planner. The utility of a θ - type agent who reports ˆ θ is given by













taking h0 as given.3 The incentive compatibility constraint requires the allocation to be such
that θ - type agent prefers to report his own type to any other report: For all θ ∈ Θ it is
required that
V (θ;θ) ≥ V (θ;ˆ θ) ∀ˆ θ ∈ Θ (1)
An allocation that is both feasible and incentive compatible will be called incentive-
feasible. Denote the set of all incentive feasible allocations by ΣIF. The social planner
chooses an incentive feasible allocation to maximize the expected utility of an agent:











3C h a r a c t e r i z i n g E ﬃcient Allocations
In this section I will characterize incentive feasible allocations by using the ﬁrst order and
envelope conditions. Before doing so, I will show one important feature of the solution to
the social planner’s problem: period utility of each agent will be constant over time. This
fact will help to simplify the structure of the ﬁrst order conditions signiﬁcantly.
2Schooling st and labor supply lt can be recovered by inverting the human capital production function
and output production function respectively.
3The dependence of V on h0 is kept implicit.
6Deﬁne period utility ut(θ)=ct(θ)+v(1−
yt(θ)
θht(θ)−g(ht(θ),h t+1(θ)). Next proposition states
that, in the optimum, the social planner will never want period utility of a given agent to
vary across time. The reason is that, with quasilinear utility and interest rate equal to the
discount rate there are no costs of transferring utility across time in terms of consumption
and everyone prefers constant ﬂow of utility to a time varying one. The proof is omitted,
because it is straightforward.
Proposition 1 If an allocation σ solves the social planner’s problem then for all θ ∈ Θ,
ut(θ)=u(θ) for some function u(θ).
From now on, I will think of period utility to be the choice variable of the social planner.
I will also restrict attention to incentive feasible allocations that exhibit the property that
period utility is constant over time and call them constant utility incentive feasible.I w i l l
also think about allocation in terms of labor supply lt(θ)=
yt(θ)
θht(θ) rather than in terms of
output. To sum up, an allocation σ will now consist of period utility u(θ) and sequences of
labor supply and human capital σl,h = {lt,h t+1}∞
t=0.
I will now derive two sets of necessary conditions for incentive compatibility: the ﬁrst
order condition w.r.t. ht+1 and the envelope condition w.r.t. θ. Iu s et h ee n v e l o p ec o n d i t i o n
rather than the ﬁrst order condition because it is more general and applies even in the case
when allocations are not diﬀerentiable in θ.



























)= if g(ht,h t+1) > 0( 4 )
Proof. See the Appendix.
The ﬁrst equation (3) shows how agent’s period utility varies with his type. The variation
in period utility is proportional to the informational rent an agent obtains from having a
7certain type. u0 is the utility of the the lowest type agent, who gets no informational rent.
The second equation (4) is the Euler equation in human capital.
An allocation that exhibits constant period utility, satisfy the resource constraint and the
constraints (3) and (4) as constant utility ﬁrst order incentive feasible. The social planner’s
problem of maximizing expected utility by choosing a constant utility ﬁrst order incentive
feasible allocation will be called a relaxed social planner’s problem.
The two constraints (3) and (4) are necessary for an allocation to be incentive compatible,
but not suﬃcient. Thus, the solution to the relaxed social planner’s problem may not be
identical to the solution of the social planner’s problem. There are two reasons why this may
be true. First, an individual might ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate jointly in his choice of human
capital and in his choice of report. Kocherlakota [13] argues that similar joint deviations
are proﬁtable. In the appendix I show a simple two period example that this may happen
in my setting as well (to be added). Second, even if human capital sequence were ﬁxed at
a given level and joint deviation were not proﬁtable, the envelope condition (3) might still
not be enough to prevent deviation in the report itself. This is a well known problem from
the static optimal taxation literature.
Therefore, I will consider an ex-post incentive compatibility veriﬁcation procedure sug-
gested by Abraham and Pavoni. After the optimum is found using only the necessary
conditions, I will allow the agents to reoptimize and choose a diﬀerent report and a diﬀerent
human capital sequence. If the agents decide not to change their behavior, the allocation is
incentive compatible and an eﬃcient welfare maximizing allocation is found.
3.1 The Lagrangean
Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint and µ(θ)f(θ) be the Lagrange





















L(σ,λ,µ) s.t. (4) (5)
I will now partially characterize the optimum. First order condition in λ is just the
requirement that the resource constraint must be satisﬁed. The resource constraint is now
written in terms of u and σl,h :
θ Z
θ





[θhtlt − v(lt + st)]fdθ. (6)
T h eL a g r a n g em u l t i p l i e rλ is therefore such that (6) holds and I will denote such value
λ
∗. First order condition in u(θ)a n di nu0 are
U
0(u)=λ − µ (7)
Z
Θ
µfdθ =0 ( 8 )




0(u) − λ]fdθ =0 ( 9 )
This equation says that, on average, marginal utility must be equal to the shadow price
of resources. It holds because increasing or decreasing utility uniformly for all agents is
feasible for the social planner and has no eﬀect on the incentive compatibility constraint.
Unlike models with no private information, this equation does not hold for each agent. On
the contrary, private information introduces distortions in a sense that marginal utility of
almost all agents is not equal to the shadow price of resources.
Instead of taking ﬁrst order conditions in σl,h Iw i l ld e ﬁne a partially optimized La-
grangean ˆ L(σl,h) where (6), (7) and (8) are assumed to hold. I will denote the value of the
9Lagrange multiplier λ such that (6) holds by λ



































∗]f(ε)dε}fdθ + ξ(u) − λE (10)
where I have deﬁned ξ(u)= 1
1−β
R θ
θ {U(u) − U0(u)u}fdθ. The equality uses integration by
parts and equation (8) to reverse the order of integration. For a given σl,h the optimal
utility allocation u is mechanically given by (3) and so the choice variables of the partially
optimized Lagrangean are only σl,h.
Deﬁne a cumulative distortion function Xu,λ(θ) to be a function giving, for each agent,
the average percentage deviation of marginal utility from the shadow price, the average being








The cumulative distortion function will play an important role later on and so it is
worthwhile to analyze its properties.
Lemma 3 Suppose that u is increasing. Then Xu,λ(θ) is positive for all θ ∈ Θ In addition,
Xu,λ(θ)=Xu,λ(θ)=0 .
Proof. Xu,λ(θ)=0i so b v i o u s .Xu,λ(θ) = 0 follows from (9). Since u is increasing in θ
and U is strictly concave, U0 is decreasing in θ. Equation (9) then implies that U0(u) − λ is
ﬁrst positive and then negative. Consequently,
R θ
θ [U0(u) − λ]fdε is always positive.
The cumulative distortion function is thus is a hump-shaped nonnegative function that
starts and ends at 0. The assumption that u is increasing is rather innocuous - it follows
directly from the envelope condition (3).
10The cumulative distortion function appears directly in the Lagrangean (10). One can













Xu,λ∗(θ)}fdθ + ξ(u) − λ
∗E



















Xu,λ∗(θ)}fdθ + ξ(u) − λ














Xu,λ∗(θ)}fdθ + ξ(u) − λ
∗Es . t . (4)
Thus, one can break the maximization of the partially optimized Lagrangean into a
continuum of separate maximization problems. These maximization problems are intercon-
nected - but only through the cumulative distribution function. In other words, knowledge of
x = Xu,λ(θ)i ss u ﬃcient to compute the optimal sequence of labor supply and human capital
stock for a θ−type individual. For an arbitrary distortion x, the value of this problem is
given by












0 · g(ht,h t+1) · 1 − lt ∀t ≥ 0




way to look at this problem is to view it as an individual’s problem, which is aﬀected by a
cumulative distortion.4 I will therefore call this problem an individual’s distorted problem.
This problem is much simpler than the original problem of ﬁnding the utility maximizing
report - and that is the main beneﬁt of this formulation. Moreover, it will be shown that the
4If x = 0 then this problem is identical to the individual’s problem with no government intervention.
11individual’s distorted problem can be conveniently written recursively. Before that, I will
summarize and formally prove the results found so far.
Theorem 4 (The Decomposition Theorem) An allocation σ∗, together with the La-
grange multiplier on the resource constraint λ
∗ solves the relaxed social planner’s problem



















and it satisﬁes X∗(¯ θ)=0 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Although the social planner’s problem is not a convex problem, suﬃciency is obtained
even with reliance on the ﬁrst order condition in u. The reason is that all the nonconvex
elements of the problem appear in the individual’s distorted problem where I did not rely
on the ﬁrst order conditions.
The theorem is called the Decomposition theorem, because of its main ﬁnding - one
can decompose the social planner’s problem into two related but distinct problems. One
problem is to ﬁnd the utility allocation u. This is, essentially, the problem of redistribution
between agents of diﬀerent skills. The second problem is to ﬁnd the sequence of labor supply
and human capital allocations. This is the dynamic problem where the evolution of human
capital plays the major role. These two problems are interrelated. The individual’s distorted
problem is connected with the problem of redistribution in a very simple way - only through
the cumulative distortion function. On the other hand, the redistribution problem is aﬀected
by the individual’s problem in a much more complex way. In particular, the whole solution to
the distorted problem matters for both the resource constraint and the envelope condition
(3). What is important, however, is that the individual’s distorted problem is so simple,
because it is the dynamic element of the model which is by far the hardest to solve for.
I will now turn to the recursive characterization of the individual’s distorted problem.
123.2 A Recursive Characterization
The individual’s distorted problem involves one endogenous state variable - human capital
and two exogenous state variables - individual’s skill level θ and the distortion x.B o t ho f
these variables work like a ﬁxed eﬀect - they are constant over time. To ensure that the Euler




is the marginal disutility from increasing next period human capital by one unit. It is also
the left-hand side of the Euler equation (4) and so it becomes a convenient co-state variable.
In a recursive representation of the individual’s distorted problem, the agent is thus required
to choose only allocations such that the beneﬁts from investing in human capital, i.e. the
right-hand side of (4) are equal to d. The Bellman equation is
Qx,θ(h,d)=m a x






















It is straightforward to show that there is an equivalence between this dynamic program
and the original sequence program:
Q0(x,θ,h 0)=m a x
d
Qx,θ(h0,d)
since in the ﬁrst period the allocation does not have to deliver any particular d. Similarly, the
solution to the sequence individual’s distorted problem can be generated from the solution
to the recursive individual’s distorted problem.
4 Implementation in a Competitive Equilibrium
I now turn attention to the implementation of the eﬃcient allocations in a competitive
equilibrium. One way for the government to do it is to impose income taxes that depend
13on the whole lifetime proﬁle of incomes. This implementation is a relatively straightforward
extension of Werning’s [19] result. I will instead use the fact that the utility function is
such that there are no income eﬀects on labor supply. I will argue that much simpler
implementation may be available. In particular, if people can borrow and save at the interest
rate 1
β −1, one may be able to implement the eﬃcient allocations by using income taxes that
depend only on current income.
In Kapicka [10] I show that allocations implementable by current income taxes can be
conveniently represented by a mechanism where the social planner has no memory. The
agent is asked to report his type each period and the allocations depend only on current
report. In general, the mechanism with no memory imposes much more severe restrictions
on the allocations than the eﬃcient mechanism introduced in section 2: reporting agent’s
true type must be preferred to any alternative sequence of reports. This stands in contrast
with the requirement (1) that reporting true type must be preferred to any report that is
constant over time. By requiring that the agent does not want to deviate in any single period
the mechanism with limited memory restricts the ability to transfer informational rents of
an agent across time. That’s why taxes that depend only on current income are in general
inferior to taxes that depend on the whole sequence of incomes.
An eﬃcient allocation will therefore in general not satisfy the constraints of the mecha-
n i s mw i t hl i m i t e dm e m o r y .C a no n em a k e - u pf o rt h i sd e ﬁciency with unlimited borrowing
and saving? That is, can private markets give the agents the ability to transfer resources
across time that was taken away from the government by the restriction of history indepen-
dent income taxes?
The answer to this question is a qualiﬁed yes. To show where the problem lies, consider
ﬁrst a case of exogenous human capital. In this case, using current income taxes together
with borrowing and saving will indeed implement the optimum. The argument goes as
follows. For any constant utility incentive feasible allocation, one can ﬁnd another allocation
which delivers the same present value of consumption, the same labor supply and satisﬁes
the restrictions of the mechanism with limited memory. That is, this allocation can be
implemented with history independent taxes. Allowing the agents to borrow and save will
then allow them to choose the eﬃcient sequence of consumption. The assumption of no
14income eﬀects is the second step of the argument: with income eﬀects the agent might be
able to jointly deviate in the sequence of reports and in savings. Next lemma shows the ﬁrst
part of the result formally. For the purpose of this lemma I deﬁne an allocation to be a pair
of utility and income.
Lemma 5 Suppose that human capital is exogenous. Then for any constant utility in-





t˜ ut and an allocation {˜ ut,l t}t≥0 satisﬁes for all t ≥ 0,a l lθ,ˆ θ
˜ ct(θ) − v(1 −
yt(θ)
θht




where ˜ ct(θ)=˜ ut(θ)+v(1 −
yt(θ)
θht − S(ht,h t+1)).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The idea of the proof is that with no income eﬀects, one can rearrange the utility sequence
in such a way that the present value of utility is the same but, taking any period separately,
the agents prefer to tell the truth. That is, oﬀering the agents the option to change her report
in each period will not make her better oﬀ. But that essentially transforms the problem into
a series of static problems. That is, one can induce the agent to supply the same labor
supply with mechanism that has no memory and consequently with taxes that depend only
on current income. The cost, however, is that the utility sequence is no longer constant.
Suppose now that the agents can borrow or save at the interest rate 1
β −1. I want to show
that when agents are allowed to trade, they will choose the eﬃcient allocation {u,lt}t≥0. To
show this, two things needs to be proven. First, agent’s trading must not aﬀect her labor
supply. This result is a consequence of the fact that there are no income eﬀects. Second,
the agents must choose constant utility u. This result is also easy to show. The budget












t}t≥0 is the sequence of utility allocations chosen by the agent. Is not hard to see
that the agents will choose a constant sequence of utility: u∗
t = u∗. Therefore u∗ is equal
15to u. The utility will be the same as under the eﬃcient mechanism. Thus, I conclude that
to implement any constant utility incentive feasible allocation {u,lt}t≥0 o n ec a nu s ei n c o m e
taxes that depend only on current income and allow agent borrow and save. They will end
up choosing labor supply {lt}t≥0 and have period utility u.
With human capital is endogenous, the above result does not hold: an agent my beneﬁt
by jointly deviating in the sequence of reports and the sequence of human capital. However,
the set of ﬁrst order incentive feasible allocations that can be implemented with history
independent mechanism is the same as the set of ﬁrst order incentive feasible allocations
that can be implemented with eﬃcient mechanism. If there is a proﬁtable deviation in the
history independent mechanism, it is in this sense a second order deviation.
Ultimately, the question whether history independent taxes can be used is therefore a
quantitative one. In some cases it may be true while in some cases it may not. I will therefore
construct an ex-post implementation veriﬁcation procedure. After the eﬃcient allocation is
found, I will check if there is a sequence of reports that may improve upon truthtelling. If
there is none, the allocation can be decentralized with history independent income taxes and
zero capital taxes. If there is a proﬁtable deviation, one needs to use history independent
taxes to implement the eﬃcient allocations.
The implementation veriﬁcation procedure should not be confused with the incentive
compatibility veriﬁcation procedure. It is much stronger one. If an allocation passes the
ex post implementation veriﬁcation procedure, it passes the ex post incentive compatibility
veriﬁcation procedure. If not, one needs to verify incentive compatibility directly.
5N u m e r i c a l E x a m p l e
In this section I will numerically compute the optimal allocations. I will compare the optimal
tax code with the U.S. tax code and show how a potential tax reform should look like. The
utility function is assumed to be logarithmic and to exhibit a constant elasticity of labor
16supply,




where the elasticity of labor supply is given by 1
k. The human capital production function is
assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:
G(h,s)=( 1− δ)h + δh
αs
1−α.
For the utility function, I choose k = 2 so that the elasticity of labor supply is 0.5. For the
human capital production function I assume Ben-Porath speciﬁcation with α =0 .5. There
is a very diverse evidence regarding both depreciation δ. The evidence ranges from 0.0016
to 0.089, with most of the estimates concentrated around 0.04.5 This is also the value I have
chosen for parameter δ. The time period is one year and so the discount factor β was set
equal to 0.96.
I will calibrate the distribution of skills in such a way that the resulting distribution of
earnings, assuming steady state, will resemble the empirical distribution of earnings. There
is several problems with this approach. First, to meaningfully calibrate the model, one
needs to assume that the initial human capital stock varies across people. But, why can’t
the social planner then use this information or any other previous information to deduce
the distribution of skills? This problem is hard to escape with permanent type of shocks. I
suggest the following resolution. Suppose the tax reform takes place at time 0. The world
has started in period −T, when human capital was identical across population. At this time
a constitution was written saying that only income taxes that depend on current income
may be used. In the light of the previous section, this provision was not restrictive. Neither
the shape of the income tax function nor capital taxes were speciﬁed in the constitution
and were chosen by previous governments. In particular, current U.S. income tax schedule
was chosen and savings were not allowed. When the tax reform takes place in period 0, the
government must follow the constitution and so must use current income taxes.
Tax return data for 1992 are used for the empirical distribution of earnings. Since the
data are hence the implied skills levels not very smooth, I use a double Pareto-Lognormal
5See the evidence in Browning, Hansen and Heckman [3] or Trostel [18].
17distribution to approximate the empirical distribution of skills. This distribution combines
lognormal distribution with heavy Paretian tails and replicates the empirical distribution
reasonably well.6 To calibrate the distribution of skills I ﬁrst construct the U.S. income
tax code. I use the NBER TAXSIM program to construct the eﬀective federal marginal
income tax schedule for calendar year 1992. The agent in the model is supposed to represent
a household. Thus I restrict attention to married couples with two children. I adjust the
income tax schedule by adding state income tax and sales tax as a linear tax.7 What
needs to be determined are government transfers, which are supposed to be independent of
income and thus correspond to the negative of income tax at income equal to 0. Their value
will be determined endogenously to balance the government budget. It is supposed that
consumption to income ratio is 0.75. Thus, government expenditures are equal to 25% of
total income.
T os o l v ef o rt h ee ﬃcient allocations I follow the following procedure. I ﬁx the utility
allocation u and the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint λ. I then compute the
cumulative distortion function Xu,λ and adjust u0 until this function satisﬁes Xu,λ(θ)=0 .
I then solve the dynamic program 11 for each agent and generate the sequence of human
capital and labor supply allocations for 250 periods. The envelope condition (3) is then used
to compute a new utility allocation Tu.I repeat the procedure until kTu− uk·ε for some
error tolerance ε. After that, I check if the resource constraint holds with equality (up to an
error tolerance). If not, I update the Lagrange multiplier λ until the resource constraint is
satisﬁed with equality.
The results are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 depicts the marginal tax rates
in periods 1, 50, and 250 (when the economy is more or less in a steady state)8.T h e
Figure shows that marginal income tax rates decrease over time. They decrease more or less
uniformly, by the same amount for each income level. The largest decreases are concentrated
in the initial periods. The intuition is that it is the future marginal tax rate that drives
6See Jorgensen and Reed [9] for the deﬁnition of the distribution.
7Tax rates for the state income tax and sales tax were obtained by dividing government receipts from
these taxes by labor income and consumption respectively. Their values were 2.78% and 7.06% .
8Marginal income taxes in period 1 appear not to be smooth. This is because the current marginal tax
rates are not smooth as well and this property is inherited by the initial distribution of human capital.
18investment in human capital. Current marginal tax rates are therefore less important for
the investment and the social planner can aﬀord to set them higher.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
The overall gain in the production can be decomposed into two elements. First, there is
a static gain in the ﬁrst period, when only labor supply can be adjusted. This gain turn to
be fairly small, about 2.2% of aggregate income. Then there is the dynamic gain in the long
run, when the human capital is adjusted. Figure 2 shows that this gain is much larger: in
the long run, the aggregate income increases by as much as 28% of initial production.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Figure 2 also shows how the government expenditures are ﬁnanced. The government runs
ad e ﬁcit in the ﬁrst 18 periods. After that, the production abilities of the economy are
improved and the government starts paying oﬀ the deﬁcit.
5.1 Implementation Veriﬁcation Procedure
TO BE COMPLETED
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the eﬃcient allocations in a dynamic economy where private informa-
tion skill shocks are permanent and human capital is endogenous and unobservable by the
government. The main contribution is to provide a tractable framework which can be used
to analyze these allocations as well as to provide an algorithm to compute them numerically.
I also discuss the problem of implementation of the eﬃcient allocations in a competitive
equilibrium and show it may be possible to do so in a very simple way: with history in-
dependent taxes and unlimited borrowing and saving. The features of government policies
are thus very diﬀerent from the case when the dynamics of allocations is driven by private
information: the tax function is much simpler and borrowing and lending by an individual
is not distorted. Numerical simulations reveal several interesting results: Marginal income
19taxes should decrease over time and this decrease is more or less uniform over all ranges of
income. The production gains from the adjustment of human capital are much larger than
the gains from adjustment of labor supply. Government should ﬁrst run deﬁcit to ﬁnance
the tax reform.
The results were found under the assumptions that government can freely borrow and save
at a given interest rate, and utility function is such that there are no income eﬀects. What
happens if these assumptions, as well as the assumption of permanent skills, are relaxed? The
assumption of permanent shocks is crucial for one reason: it ensures that the cumulative
distortion is constant over time. If the private information about the shocks is revealed
over time, this will no longer hold. In this case, there are two sources of dynamics: the
evolution of private information and the evolution of individual speciﬁc state variable. Both
elements are probably important in determining the eﬃcient allocations and government
policies. Whether such problem can be successfully solved depends on the ability to write the
Decomposition theorem recursively. One faces similar complications when the assumption
that government can borrow or save is relaxed. Again, the main implication is that the time
proﬁle of cumulative distortions will no longer be constant.
When the assumption of no income eﬀects is relaxed, one faces two types of problems.
First, the individual’s distorted problem is complicated by the fact that it also depends on
individual’s utility. Thus, the dimension of the state space increases. Second, one may face
additional complications with the implementation since now a joint deviation in savings,
human capital investment and labor supply may be proﬁtable. In such case one needs to use
more complicated tax functions to implement the optimum.
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227 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. I will omit the proof that (4) is necessary. Applying the envelope


















t(ε)=v0(lt(ε)+g(ht(ε),h t+1(ε)). I will also skip the proof that the envelope theorem
applies. It is a fairly straightforward modiﬁcation of the proof that can be found in ([10]) or
in Mirrlees ([16]).



































ε +U0 which is
clearly diﬀerentiable in θ. Note that U0[U−1(ϕ(θ))] = U0(u(θ)) and so both terms involving
U0(u(θ)) cancel out. What remains is equation (3), where u0 = U−1(ϕ(0)) = U−1(U0).
Proof of Theorem 4. Necessity of the conditions is obvious. For suﬃciency, let
σ∗ = {u∗(θ),l ∗
t(θ),h ∗
t+1(θ)}, together with ˆ λ
∗
and µ∗ = λ
∗ − U0(u∗)b ea na l l o c a t i o nt h a t
satisﬁes the conditions of the theorem. Let σ = {ut(θ),l t(θ),h t+1(θ)} be an alternative
allocation that solves 2. I will prove suﬃciency if I show that allocation σ∗ delivers expected
utility at least as high as σ.











and so it will suﬃce to show that the right hand side of the inequality is positive.
23To show this, substract ﬁrst the two corresponding envelope conditions. I have
u(θ) − u
∗(θ)=u(0) − u













































since [U(u(0)) − U(u∗(0))]
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The inequality follows from two facts. First, {l∗
t(θ),h ∗
t+1(θ)} maximizes individual’s dis-
torted problem and so the ﬁrst expression on the right hand side of the second equality is
nonpositive. Second, the resource constraint holds with equality and so the second expres-
sion on the right hand side of the second equality is equal to λ
∗ R
Θ(u∗ − u)fdθ. I will now
use the fact that µ∗ = λ



















∗ − u)fdθ ≥ 0
which completes the proof.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 . I will assume that human capital is exogenous and identical
for everyone. The extension for the case when human capital varies across people can be
treated in a similar way.
24If an allocation is incentive compatible then it satisﬁes (1). Taking lt as given, deﬁne a
consumption sequence ˜ ct by
Since
˜ ct(θ) − v(1 −
yt(θ)
θht
− S) ≥ ˜ ct(ˆ θ) − v(1 −
yt(ˆ θ)
θht
− S)( 1 3 )
If a pair of consumption ˜ ct(θ)a n dyt(θ)s a t i s ﬁes this condition, I will say it is incentive
compatible in period t. There is at least one consumption function ˜ ct(θ)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes (13)
and so is well deﬁned. One way to show it is to use the fact, that if ˜ ct(θ)a n dyt(θ)i sp e r i o d









+ v(1 − lt(θ) − S(ht,h t+1)) + u0.






tct. This can be done by increasing or decreasing ˜ ct(θ) by a constant amount for all t.
The allocation {˜ ct,y t}t≥0 is thus incentive compatible in all periods. It is therefore incen-
tive compatible. It also has the same present value as {ct,y t}t≥0 and is therefore incentive
feasible.














Figure 1: Marginal Income Taxes












Figure 2: Aggregate Consumption and Income
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